Brussels attacks: The predictable and despicable Powergrab aftermath

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Brussels attacks: The predictable and despicable Powergrab aftermath -

The aftermath of the Brussels attacks is as predictable as it is despicable: Politicians try trying to make a career out of the position by Reducing liberty and Increasing surveillance-even though Both are counterproductive

There is a political Saying That You shoulds. never let a good crisis go to waste. There is Among Politicians Reviews another Saying That anything good for the career is ethical by definition. hawks monitoring-have-been not resting on laurels Their cet item.

A couple of days after the attacks Brussels, we can see the political aftermath, and it's as predictable as it is counterproductive and dangerous. We're already seeing Renewed and stronger calls for more surveillance.

Hours after-Offering His resignation, Belgium's minister of justice Koen Geens Said ict intelligence services need Greater access to people's phone and internet records.

In this way, it Reminds us of the aftermath of the 04 Madrid bombings, When Politicians scrambled to create one of the MOST invasive schemes ever, the so-called Data Retention: Basically, it Meant That every electronic track you left shoulds be Retained by your operators to use the service contre you. Every person or server you contacted, how, when, From Where, and for how long. The "from where" is Especially interesting, as it Practically Provided a history of your movements, day by day, Almost down to footstep level

It Would take ten years up to the European Court of Justice -. The European Union equivalent of a Supreme Court - struck down the Data Retention Directive as utterly incompatible with Fundamental human rights. That Has not mattered. Politicians keep yelling about more and more and more common traceability of citoyens.

Of course, attackers know this. They're unfazed by this. They're not using traceable phones. They're not using phones That are feasible to trace, and invasive-even with new legislation. They're not-even bothering with encryption communicating goal in cleartext. They just carry Dozens and Dozens of burner phones - single-use phones, discarded after-one gold FEW uses - Thus completely Call negating Any collection of data about phones or phonecalls

It's politically Stated That Any reduction in liberties must. be "necessary, effective, and proportionate": it must address an APPROBATION and precise problem, it must solve That problem, and must not create worse problems in the process. Mass Surveillance is one of These Things That-have proven to be ridiculously ineffective. - Those Who want to circumvent it, find it trivial to do so for the specific purpose They Want to hide

(Interestingly, California now: has a Proposed bill to outlaw anonymous burner phones, selon Russia Today. That's an interesting Attempt qui accounts for absolutely nothing, as suicide bombers are not the Slightest Concerned with Being tracked and APPROBATION after-a successful attack.)

Of race, proponents of mass monitoring try to justify Their cause. Purpose When the proponents of mass monitoring state supervision HAS That stopped X number of terror attacks, most is of the time, they 're lying through Their teeth - and fortunately, this is trivial to verify. Even if the method Was secret and can not be told in public, the "stopped terror attack" is the major share: prepaid mass destruction ( "terror") is a very serious crime, Almost as serious a crime as Actually executing the planned mass destruction. So if We had X number of thwarted plots, we also have the exact Would Sami X number of very public court verdicts of "guilty" of schedule Such mass destruction. If we do not-have That verdict, there simply Was not Such a schedule in process That Was thwarted.

And for MOST countries, the number Claimed is in excess of a dozen, and the actual court records show a big fat zero. This is indicative of Reviews another well-Established political process Known As "lying like a weasel When you think you can get away with it."

There's a pattern here of Adding Reducing monitoring and effectiveness. The only thing proven to work contre this kind of attacks is old classic detective Police work: Were the attackers already Known by Police and HAD-even-been flagged as potential terrorists based on Arrests and very traditional policing work. Adding more monitoring just does not work. It adds more noise, not signal more

In one way, the terror attack in Stockholm on Christmas 2010 is Some sort of template for thesis power grabs. En ce que attack, a lone suicide bomber failed to kill anybody goal himself, as His suicide vest detonated prematurely in an alley just ahead of the city streets full of Christmas shoppers; Police Were busy putting out a burning elsewhere because He Had filled with gas cylinders and detonated as a diversionary tactic.

So in the end, this Particular attacker killed nobody goal himself. That did not stop the Swedish Security Police - the Säpo - from time immediately Demanding new monitoring powers into people's email and more, in order to prevent prevention similar attacks in the future. Aim as it turned out, the attacker HAD sent a mail to the Säpo explaining exactly what He Was going to do, how, and when to. HOWEVER, Being a Saturday and all, That mail was not read For a Few more days.

In --other words, the anti-terror Police Did not fail to prevent prevention this template attack Because They couldn 't read --other people's email; They failed to prevent prevention it Because They Did not read Their Own email

Monitoring Does not just not work. it's counterproductive.

Privacy remains your own responsibility.

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